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Abstract
Consider the problem of consistent Bayesian estimation of a stationary “k’th-order
Markov process” on a finite state space, when the parameter k is itself unknown, as
well as the transition probabilities for each value of k. First, I show that if k has a
known upper bound, then on a single realization of the process the posterior probabil-
ity measures on the parameter space converge weakly to a probability measure with
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mass 1 concentrated on the true process, provided that the prior probability measure
has full support and the true process is irreducible. Second, I extend this result to the
case in which k is unbounded (but finite), which requires that the Bayesian decision-
maker (DM) construct a prior on an infinite-dimensional parameter space. Finally, in
an alternative approach to this case, I suppose that the DM considers a succession of
models corresponding to larger and larger values of k. Each time the DM revises his
model he extends his prior probability measure to the new - and larger - parameter
space in a way that is "consistent" with the previous prior, and recomputes his pos-
terior probability measures. I show that, roughly speaking, if the DM does not revise
his model “too frequently,” then he will be increasingly confident that the current
posterior is increasingly concentrated on the true process. I motivate the procedure
of model revision by considerations of bounded rationality.
1 Introduction
In these notes I consider the problem of consistent Bayesian estimation of a stationary
“k’th-order Markov process” on a finite state space, from a single realization of the
process, when the parameter k is itself unknown, as well as the transition probabilities
for each value of k. (Recall that, roughly speaking, a k’th-order Markov process is a
stochastic process such that, for each date, the conditional probability distribution of
the future given the past depends at most on the last k observations. A more precise
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definition is given below.) Since the parameter space for this problem is infinite-
dimensional, consistent Bayesian estimation may be problematic. At least, such a
concern is suggested by the analogous case of estimating an infinite-dimensional pa-
rameter vector from a sequence of independent and identically distributed random
variables (see Freedman, 1963, and Diaconis and Freedman, 1986). The case con-
sidered here diﬀers from the latter in two respects. On the one hand, the successive
observations are assumed to take values in a finite set. On the other hand, the suc-
cessive observations are not assumed to be mutually independent.
Let M(k) denote the space of stationary k’th-order Markov processes on a given
finite state space. Note that if k0 ≤ k, then M(k0) can be identified with a subset
of M(k) in a natural way. I first consider the case in which k has a known upper
bound. In this case the parameter space of the process is finite-dimensional, and one
can use Freedman’s method to show that the posterior probability measure on the
parameter space converges weakly to a probability measure with mass 1 concentrated
on the true process, provided that the prior probability measure has full support and
the true process is irreducible (Theorem 6).
I next consider the case in which k is unbounded (but finite). Let M denote the
union of the sets M(k). I show that the conclusion of Theorem 6 remains true if the
prior on M is a convex combination of priors on M(k) for which the assumptions of
Theorem 6 are satisfied for all suﬃciently large k (Theorem 9).
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In the case covered by Theorem 9, in which an upper bound on the parameter k
is not known, the Bayesian must construct a prior on the entire space M . Since M is
infinite dimensional, it might be diﬃcult for an individual to formulate beliefs about
such a large space that are suﬃciently precise to yield a meaningful prior. In the
last section I outline an alternative approach, which is a process of model revision.
Suppose that the Bayesian decision-maker (DM) considers a succession of models
corresponding to larger and larger values of k. Each time the DM revises his model
he extends his prior probability measure to the new - and larger - parameter space
in a way that is "consistent" (in a way to be specified) with the previous prior, and
recomputes his posterior probability measures. I show that, roughly speaking, if the
DM does not revise his model “too frequently,” then he will be increasingly confident
that the current posterior is increasingly concentrated on the true process. Indeed,
since the dimension of the parameter space increases geometrically with k, the time
intervals between successive model revisions must be increasingly long.
The procedure of model revision studied here can be motivated by considerations
of bounded rationality. At the beginning of an empirical investigation, a DM will
typically find it diﬃcult to formulate beliefs about a very large parameter space that
are suﬃciently precise to yield a meaningful prior probability measure on the space.
Savage (1954, pp. 59, 168, 169) refers to this as the “problem of vagueness.” (See also
Radner, 1996, 1999). However, as he gains experience with the investigation the DM
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may explore increasingly complex models with increasingly large parameter spaces.
In this context, a natural question is whether there is a “rational” way to do this.
The present analysis can be seen as a step in trying to answer this question.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section I formulate the model and present some preliminalry results that will
be useful tools for the analysis of the following sections. These results are standard
and/or can be derived using standard methods, but are gathered here for the conve-
nience of the reader. With an eye to possible generalizations and extensions of the
main results, I have presented a formulation that is somewhat more general than is
strictly required for what follows.
Let X denote the set of all infinite sequences, {x(t)}, where t ranges over N, the
nonnegative integers, and x(t) takes values in some finite set, I, the same for all
t. Call I the state space. For concreteness, think of t as time (discrete), and I as
a finite set of integers. Let every subset of I be measurable, and let H denote the
product sigma-field of measurable subsets ofX. For each integer t, letH(t) denote the
subsigma-field generated by “histories” up through date t. For short, the measurable
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space (X,H) will be denoted byX. The space X can also be metrized in a compatible
way. Take the distance between two integers in I to be the absolute value of their
diﬀerence, and endow X with the corresponding product topology. This is also the
metric topology with the metric ,
σ(x, y) =
∞X
t=0
µ
1
2t
¶
|x(t)− y(t)|, for x, y in X. (1)
For this topology, X is a compact metric space, and the Borel sets of X are the sets
in H. Note that, since I is finite,
lim
n→∞
xn = x⇐⇒ for every t, eventually xn(t) = x(t). (2)
Let P (X) denote the set of (countably additive) probability measures on X, or, in
a diﬀerent language, the set of stochastic processes with state space I. [More generally,
if (Y,Y) is a measurable space, let P (Y ) denote the set of probability measures on
(Y,Y).] Let C(X) denote the set of bounded continuous real-valued functions on X.
Endow P (X) with the topology of weak* convergence, namely, for {mn} and m in
P (X):
mn → m ≡
Z
c(x)dmn(x)→
Z
c(x)dm(x), for every c ∈ C(X).
Since X is a compact metric space, so is P (X) (see Parthasarathy, 1967, Ch. II,
Theorem 6.4, p. 45).
Proposition 2 below gives another characterization of weak* convergence in P (X).
Proposition 3 describes a base for the open sets in P (X). Endow C(X) with the sup
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norm topology. The first step in this analysis is to construct a countable dense subset
of C(X). For each n ≥ 0 let Fn denote the set of all real-valued functions on X that
depend only on the first n + 1 coordinates, x(0), ..., x(n). Note that, by (2), every
element of Fn is in C(X). Also, Fn is essentially R(n+1)I . Let Γn be a countable dense
subset of Fn, and define the countable set Γ by:
Γ = ∪n≥0Γn. (3)
Proposition 1 Γ is dense in C(X).
Proof. Fix an element of I; call it 0. For each nonnegative integer n define the
mapping φn from X into itself by:
φn(x)(t) = x(t), for 0 ≤ t ≤ n, (4)
= 0, for t > n.
By (2),
lim
n→∞
φn(x) = x, uniformly in x. (5)
Consider an f ∈ C(X), and define fn ∈ Fn by
fn(x) = f [φn(x)].
Since f is uniformly continuous, for every  > 0 there is an n such that
|fn(x)− f(x)| ≤ /2, for all x ∈ X.
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Also, there exists g ∈ Γn such that
|g(x)− fn(x)| ≤ /2, for all x ∈ X.
Putting the last two statements together, we have: for every  > 0 there exists an n
and a g ∈ Γn such that
|g(x)− f(x)| ≤ , for all x ∈ X.
Hence Γ is dense in C(X), which completes the proof.
The next proposition provides an alternative characterization of weak* conver-
gence in P (X). For any nonnegative integer h and any subset of A0 of Ih, the set
A = A0 × I∞ (6)
is called a finite-dimensional cylinder set (of dimension h+ 1). Thus whether x ∈ A
depends only on the first h coordinates, x(0), ..., x(h− 1).
Proposition 2 mn → m in P (X) if and only if mn(A) converges to m(A) for
every finite-dimensional cylinder set A.
Proof. First suppose that mn → m. Let A be a finite-dimensional cylinder set,
and let f be its indicator function, i.e., f(x) = 1 if x ∈ A and 0 otherwise. Then
f ∈ Fh for some h (see the paragraph preceding Proposition 1), and hence is also in
C(X), so that
mn(A) =
Z
X
fdmn →
Z
X
fdm = m(A).
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Conversely, suppose that mn(A)→ m(A) for every finite-dimensional cylinder set A.
By Proposition 1, for any f ∈ C(X) there exists a sequence {fj} of functions in Γ
such that
kfj − f)k→ 0 as j →∞.
Fix j, and observe that j ∈ Γh for some h. For the purpose of this proof, let I = Ih+1,
and for any a ∈ I define
A(a) = {x ∈ X : x(t) = a(t)} for 0 ≤ t ≤ h,
ψ(a) = fj(x) for x ∈ A(a);
then Z
X
fjdmn =
X
a∈I
ψ(a)mn[A(a)]→
X
a∈I
ψ(a)m[A(a)] =
Z
X
fjdm. (7)
For any µ ∈ P (X),¯¯¯¯Z
X
fdµ−
Z
X
fjdµ
¯¯¯¯
≤
Z
X
|f − fj| dµ ≤ kf − fjk , (8)
where |f − fj| denotes the function with values |f(x)− fj(x)|. For every  > 0 there
exists a j()such that
j ≥ j()⇒ kf − fjk ≤ ⇒¯¯¯¯Z
X
fdmn −
Z
X
fdm
¯¯¯¯
≤
¯¯¯¯Z
X
fdmn −
Z
X
fjdmn
¯¯¯¯
+
¯¯¯¯Z
X
fjdmn −
Z
X
fjdm
¯¯¯¯
+
¯¯¯¯Z
X
fjdm−
Z
X
fdm
¯¯¯¯
≤
¯¯¯¯Z
X
fjdmn −
Z
X
fjdm
¯¯¯¯
+ 2.
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Hence, by (8), for every  > 0,
lim sup
m→∞
¯¯¯¯Z
X
fdmn −
Z
X
fdm
¯¯¯¯
≤ 2,
and hence
lim
m→∞
¯¯¯¯Z
X
fdmn −
Z
X
fdm
¯¯¯¯
= 0,
which completes the proof.
I next describe a base for the open sets of P (X). Following Parthasarathy,
1967, Ch. 6, Theorem 6.2, p. 43, I shall construct a metric on P (X) that generates
the topology of weak* convergence. Let {gj} be a (countably infinite) listing of the
elements of Γ. (Every gj is a real-valued function on X that depends only on a finite
number of coordinates; see Proposition 1.). Define the map J from P (X) × N into
R∞ by
J(m, j) =
Z
gjdm, j = 0, 1, 2, ...;
then J is a homeomorphism. Recall that convergence in R∞ is pointwise convergence.
Hence:
Proposition 3 A base for the open sets of P (X) is the family of all sets of the
form
B(E,A) = {m ∈ P (X) : J(m, j) ∈ Aj, j ∈ E}, (9)
where E is a finite set of integers, for each j, Aj is an open subset of reals, and A is
the family of sets {Aj : j ∈ E}.
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I now consider P = P [P (X)], again with the topology of weak* convergence.
In particular, I shall be interested in when a sequence {pn} in P converges to a
probability measure concentrated on a single point, say m, in P (X). The latter is
sometimes called the Dirac measure at m, and will be denoted by D(m). In the
application, {pn} will be a sequence of “posterior probability measures” on P (X),
and m will be the “true” probability measure on X.
Proposition 4 For m ∈ P (X),
lim
n→∞
pn(A) = 1 for every open set A containing m
implies that
pn → D(m) in P.
Proof. Fix m ∈ P (X), and for the purpose of the proof let D = D(m). Let f be
a real-valued, bounded, continous function on P (X) (i.e., in C(P (X))), with bound
b. First note that Z
P (X)
fdD = f(m).
Next, for any  > 0 there exists an open neighborhood A of m such that q ∈ A ⇒
|f(q)− f(m)| ≤ . Also, by the hypothesis, there exists an N such that
n ≥ N ⇒ pn(A) ≥ 1− .
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Hence, for n ≥ N,
¯¯¯¯Z
P (X)
fdpn −
Z
P (X)
fdD
¯¯¯¯
=
¯¯¯¯Z
P (X)
fdpn − f(m)
¯¯¯¯
=
¯¯¯¯Z
P (X)
fdpn − f(m)
Z
P (X)
dpn
¯¯¯¯
=
¯¯¯¯Z
P (X)
[f(q)− f(m)]dpn(q)
¯¯¯¯
=
¯¯¯¯Z
P (X)\A
[f(q)− f(m)]dpn(q)
¯¯¯¯
+
¯¯¯¯Z
A
[f(q)− f(m)]dpn(q)
¯¯¯¯
≤ 2b+ .
Hence, for every  > 0,
lim sup
n→∞
¯¯¯¯Z
P (X)
fdpn −
Z
P (X)
fdD
¯¯¯¯
≤ 2b+ .
It follows that
lim
n→∞
Z
P (X)
fdpn =
Z
P (X)
fdD.
Since this is true for every such f , the conclusion of the proposition follows.
Now consider a particular m0 ∈ P (X), and let D0 = D(m0) be the Dirac
measure at m0. Let {pn} be a sequence of measures in P. By Proposition 4, pn → D0
if
lim
n→∞
pn[B(E,A)] = 1 for every set B(E,A) of the form (9) containing m0. (10)
In these notes, I shall concentrate on a particular subset of P (X). For a positive
integer k, a k’th-order Markov process is a stochastic process on X such that, for each
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date t ≥ k − 1, the conditional probability distribution of the “future” after date t,
conditioned onH(t), depends only on the last k coordinates, x(t), x(t−1), , x(t−k+1).
Recall that a stochastic process on X (i.e., a measure in P (X) ) is stationary if it
is invariant under translations inX (see, e.g., Doob, 1953, Ch. X). The corresponding
measure in P (X) is also called stationary. For each positive integer k, letM(k) denote
the set of stationary k’th-order Markov processes. Make the convention that M(0) is
the set of independent and identically distributed sequences taking values in I. Let
M denote the union of all of the sets M(k), for k nonnegative.
The following proposition is not used directly in the analysis of Bayesian inference
in M , but it gives some perspective on how “large” M is. Let S denote the set of all
stationary stochastic processes with state space I, i.e., the set of stationary measures
in P (X).
Proposition 5 M is dense in S in the topology of weak* convergence in P (X).
(Proof omitted.)
It will be useful to parametrize M . For the moment, fix k. A k’th-order Markov
process can be parametrized by a transition matrix, Q, and an initial probability
vector, s, as follows. Any sequence [x(t), ..., x(t + k − 1)] takes values in the k-fold
product of I with itself. A transition matrix, Q = ((qhj)), describes the conditional
probability that the next state is j, given that the immediately preceding history of
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k observations is h. Thus,
Q = ((qhj)), h ∈ Ik, , j ∈ I;X
j∈I
qhj = 1, for every h ∈ Ik; (11)
Pr{X(t+ 1) = j | [X(t), ..., X(t+ k − 1)] = h} = qhj, for all t ≥ k − 1.
An initial probabiity vector, (sh), describes the joint probability distribution of [X(0), ..., X(k−
1)]. Thus,
s = (sh), h ∈ Ik;X
h
sh = 1; (12)
Pr{[X(0), ..., X(k − 1)] = h} = sh.
A generic pair (Q, s) will be denoted by θ. One can identify M(k) with the space
Θ(k) of all possible such pairs, which is a subset of a closed, compact subset of a
Euclidean space of dimension |I|k+1 + |I|k, where |I| denotes the number of elements
of I. When there is no risk of confusion, I shall use the same symbol, M(k), for the
space of measures and the corresponding parameter space. Note that if k0 < k, then
M(k0) can be identified in a natural way with a lower dimensional manifold of M(k).
Finally, note that, since I is finite, weak* convergence in M(k) is equivalent to
Euclidean convergence in Θ(k).
3 Bayesian Analysis in M
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3.1 Bayesian Analysis in M(k)
Recall that M is the union of all the M(k), k ≥ 0. We are interested in “prior” and
“posterior” probability distributions on M . A prior (probability distribution) on M
is a probability measure on M , i.e., an element of P (M) ⊂ P [P (X)]. A prior µ on
M generates a probability measure on M ×X as follows. A “parameter” θ is chosen
according to µ. Conditional on θ, the stochastic process X∞ = {X(t)} is generated
according to the k’th-order Markov process corresponding to θ. Let x be a point inX,
let XT = [X(0), ..., X(T )] be the first (T + 1) coordinates of a particuar realization
of the stochastic process X∞, and let LT (x, θ) be the conditional probability that
XT = [x(0), ..., x(T )], given the parameter θ, i.e.,
LT (x, θ) = Pr{XT = [x(0), ..., x(T )]|θ}. (13)
LT is called the likelihood function corresponding to the first (T + 1) observations.
Given a prior µ on M , a (measurable) set A of parameters in M , a point x in X,
and a date T ≥ 0, define
ψ(x, T )(A) ≡
R
A
LT (x, θ)dµ(θ)R
M
LT (x, θ)dµ(θ
, (14)
provided the denominator is not zero. The probability measure ψ(x, T ) on M is
called the posterior distribution corresponding to the first (T +1) observations. Thus
ψ(x, T )(A) is the conditional probability that θ ∈ A, given that XT = [x(0), ..., x(T )].
(This statement is called Bayes’s Theorem.)
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Suppose now that we are given a particular θ0 in M , and that the probability
law of the stochastic process X∞ is determined by θ
0. For fixed T and A, the pos-
terior measure of A, namely ψ(X∞, T )(A), is a random variable, whose probability
distribution is governed by θ0. In other words, ψ(X∞, T ) is a “random probability
measure” on the parameter space M . We are interested in conditions under which
this sequence of random measures, {ψ(X∞, T )} almost surely converges weak* to a
probability measure that is entirely concentrated on the point θ0. As noted above, the
latter measure is sometimes called the Dirac measure at θ0, and will be denoted by
D(θ0). In this case we shall call the pair (µ, θ0) consistent, or say that µ is consistent
for θ0. By Proposition 4, a sequence {mT} converges weak* to the Dirac measure at
θ if for every open neighborhood B of θ the sequence {mT (B)} converges to unity.
For θ ∈ M(k), I shall say that θ is irreducible if the k’th-order Markov chain
corresponding to θ is irreducible. Recall that, for any k, the weak* topology onM(k)
is equivalent to the the Euclidean topology on Θ(k).
Theorem 6 If (1) µ is a prior onM such that µ[M(k)] = 1, (2) θ0 is in the support
of µ, and (3) θ0 is irreducible, then µ is consistent for θ0.
The proof is based on Theorem 1 of (Freedman, 1963), and relies on the fact that
M(k) is finite dimensional. Fix k, and for the purpose of this proof letK denote the k-
fold product of I with itself. Fix θ0 = (Q0, s0) inM(k); recall that Q0 = ((q0hj)), h ∈ K,
j ∈ I, is the matrix of transition probabities, and s0 = (s0h) is the vector of probabilities
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of the initial strings of length k. Since θ0 is irreducible, s0 is uniquely determined byQ0.
In the rest of the proof (unless otherwise noted), all random variables and probabilities
refer to the stochastic process, X∞, generated by θ
0. For any point h in K and any
date t, I shall say that h occurs at t if [X(t − k + 1), ..., X(t)] = h. Let {Tn(h)} be
the sequence of (random) times at which h occurs. The irreducibility of θ0 implies
that this sequence is a.s. infinite. For a given h, the random variables X[Tn(h) + 1]
are IID, with values in I, and probability distribution given by row h of the transition
probability matrix Q0.
Fix T , and consider the (k + T ) observations, [X(0), ...,X(k + T − 1)].Define
Nh = no. of occurences of h,
Nhj = no. of times an occurence of h is followed by state j. (15)
Note that
X
j∈I
Nhj = Nh,X
h∈K
Nh = T. (16)
The value of the likelihood function, (13), is
Lk+T−1(x, θ) = s[x(0), ..., x(k − 1)]
Y
h∈K
Y
j∈I
q
Nhj
hj . (17)
Taking the logarithm of the likelihood, we have
)k+T−1(x, θ) ≡ lnLk+T−1(x, θ) = ln s[x(0), ..., x(k − 1)] +
X
h∈K
X
j∈I
Nhj ln qhj.
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Dividing this last by T , we have
µ
1
T
¶
)k+T−1(x, θ) ≡
µ
1
T
¶
ln s[x(0), ..., x(k−1)]+
X
h∈K
µ
Nh
T
¶X
j∈I
µ
Nhj
Nh
¶
ln qhj. (18)
As T increases without bound, the following hold a.s. with respect to θ0:
lim
T→∞
Nhj = lim
T→∞
Nh =∞,
lim
T→∞
µ
1
T
¶
ln s[x(0), ..., x(k − 1)] = 0,
lim
T→∞
Nh
T
= s0(h), (19)
lim
T→∞
Nhj
Nh
= q0hj.
In particular, the sums, X
j∈I
µ
Nhj
Nh
¶
ln q0hj, (20)
behave asymptotically as in the case of IID random variables, and there are only
finitely many such sums. This suggests that the argument of Theorem 1 of (Freedman,
1963) can be modified to yield the desired conclusion. To carry this out, it will be
useful to have at hand an explicit proof for the IID case.
Lemma 7 (Freedman, 1963) Let {X(t)) be independently and identically distributed
(IID) with values in the finite set I. Let U denote the unit simplex in RI . A probability
measure on I is a point in U. Let µ be a probability measure on the Borel sets of S
(the “prior”) with full support, and let q0 be a particular point in U such that q0 >> 0
(strictly positive coordinates). Then µ is consistent for q0.
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Proof. For the reader’s convenience, I specialize the notation of Section 3 to this
case. Let Ni(T ) denote the number of dates t in the sample [X(0), ..., X(T − 1)] at
which X(t) = i. Of course, X
i∈I
Ni(T ) = T ;
the relative frequencies in the sample are given by
Fi(T ) = (1/T )Ni(T ).
The likelihood of the sample, given the probabilty vector q ∈ U , is
L(T, q) =
Y
i∈I
qNi(T )i , (21)
and the posterior probability of a (measurable) subset B of U is
ψ(·, T )(B) =
R
B
L(T, q)dµ(q)R
U
L(T, q)dµ(q)
. (22)
The loglikelihood of the sample, )(T, q), is the natural logarithm of the likelihood;
thus
)(T, q) = lnL(T, q) =
X
i
Ni(T ) ln qi,
(1/T ))(T, q) =
X
i
Fi(T ) ln qi. (23)
By the Strong Law of Large Numbers, if the X(t) have the probability distribution
q0, then
lim
T→∞
(1/T ))(T, q) =
X
i
q0i ln qi a.s. (24)
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For y and z in U , define
G(y, z) =
X
i
yi ln zi, (25)
with the understanding that 0 ln 0 = 0. Note that G is continuous on U2, and hence
uniformly continuous. Also, for each y,G(y, z) is concave in z, and strictly concave if
y >> 0. Furthermore,
max
z∈U
G(y, z) = G(y, y), (26)
and the maximum is attained uniquely at z = y if y >> 0. Finally, note that
(1/T ))(T, q) = G[F (T ), q], where (27)
F (T ) = (Fi(T ))i∈I .
Define the family of open sets, B(δ, y), δ > 0, y >> 0 ∈ U,by
B(δ, y) = {z : z ∈ U,G(y, y)−G(y, z) < δ}. (28)
This family constitutes a base for the open sets in U . Fix δ > 0 and q0 ∈ U, with
q0 >> 0, and consider the sets B = B(4δ, q0) and A = B(δ, q0). Write g0 ≡ G(q0, q0).
For η > 0 define C(η) to be the open sphere in U with center q0 and (Euclidean)
diameter η. Since G is uniformly continuous on U2, there exists η > 0 such that, for
all f, q ∈ U ,
f ∈ C(η)⇒ |G(f, q)−G(q0, q)| < δ. (29)
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On the one hand,
f ∈ C(η), q ∈ A⇒ (30)
G(f, q)− g0 = G(f, q)−G(q0, q) +G(q0, q)− g0
> −δ − δ = −2δ,
⇒ G(f, q) > g0 − 2δ.
On the other hand,
f ∈ C(η), q /∈ B ⇒ (31)
g0 −G(f, q) = g0 −G(q0, q) +G(q0, q)−G(f, q)
> 4δ − δ = 3δ
⇒ G(f, q) < g0 − 3δ. (32)
As usual, let ˜B denote the complement of B. Together, the last two statements
imply that,
if F (T ) ∈ C(η), thenZ
B
L(T, q)dµ(q) ≥
Z
A
L(T, q)dµ(q) > µ(A) exp[(g0 − 2δ)T ] > 0;Z
˜B
L(T, q)dµ(q) < [1− µ(B)] exp [(g0 − 3δ)T ] ;R
B
L(T, q)dµ(q)R
˜B
L(T, q)dµ(q)
> ρ(B) exp (δT ) ,
where ρ(B) ≡ µ(B)
[1− µ(B)] .
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Hence
F (T ) ∈ C(η)⇒ ψ(·, T )(B) > ρ(B) exp (δT )
1 + ρ(B) exp (δT )
. (33)
By the Strong Law of Large Numbers,
lim
T→∞
F (T ) = q0a.s.,
and hence there is a random time, T 0, such that
T ≥ T 0 ⇒ F (T ) ∈ C(η), (34)
which in turn implies that
lim
T→∞
ψ(·, T )(B) = 1. (35)
To summarize, I have shown that for any δ > 0, this limit holds for the set B =
B(4δ, q0). Hence, the limit holds for any open set B containing q0, which completes
the proof of the lemma.
To complete the proof of the theorem, corresponding to each of the sums (21),
define
Fhj(T ) =
µ
Nhj(T )
Nh(T )
¶
,
Fh(T ) = (Fhj(T ))j∈I . (36)
[Note that I show explicitly that Nhj and Nh depend on T .] Thus each Fh(T ) is a
vector in the simplex U . Let q0h denote row h of the true transition matrix, Q
0. For
22
each δ > 0 and each h ∈ K, define the (open) neighborhood B(4δ, q0h) of q0h in U as
in the proof of the lemma, and let B be the Cartesian product of these sets, i.e.,
B = ×hB(4δ, q0h). (37)
As one varies δ the family of sets B forms a basis for the neighborhoods of Q0.
Similarly, let
A = ×hB(δ, q0h). (38)
For each h let Ch(η, q0h) be the set corresponding to C(η) in the Lemma. By (20),
for each h ∈ K there is a random time T 0h such that
T ≥ T 0h ⇒ Fh(T ) ∈ Ch(η, q0h). (39)
Hence
T ≥ T 0 ≡ max
h∈K
T 0h ⇒ for every h ∈ K, Fh(T ) ∈ Ch(η, q0h). (40)
I shall now show that a calculation parallel to that in the proof of the lemma
completes the proof of the theorem. Recall from (19),
µ
1
T
¶
)k+T−1(x, θ) ≡
µ
1
T
¶
ln s[x(0), ..., x(k − 1)] +
X
h∈K
·
Nh(T )
T
¸
G [Fh(T ), qh] ,
where Fh(T ) is the vector with coordinates
Nhj(T )
Nh(T )
, j ∈ I.
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To simplify the notation, let
Ch = a sphere with center q0h such that for all q ∈ U,
f ∈ Ch ⇒ |G(f, q)−G(q0h, q)| < δ;
C = ×Ch.
Also, let
F (T ) = [Fh(T )]h∈K .
On the one hand, F (T ) ∈ C and Q ∈ A imply that, for every h,
G[Fh(T ), qh] = G[Fh(T ), qh]−G(q0h, qh) +G(q0h, qh)
≥ −δ + g0h − δ = g0h − 2δ, where
g0h = G(q
0
h, q
0
h).
On the other hand, F (T ) ∈ C and Q /∈ B imply that, for every h,
G[Fh(T ), qh] = G[Fh(T ), qh]−G(q0h, qh) +G(q0h, qh)
≤ δ + g0h − 4δ = g0h − 3δ.
Let
θ = (Q, s), θ0 = (Q0, s0),
B = {θ : Q ∈ B, s invariant for Q},
A = {θ : Q ∈ A, s invariant for Q},
S(x, k, θ) = s[x(0), ..., x(k − 1)].
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Then F (T ) ∈ C and θ ∈ A imply that
µ
1
T
¶
)k+T−1(x, θ) ≥
µ
1
T
¶
lnS(x, k, θ) +
X
h∈K
·
Nh(T )
T
¸
g0h − 2δ,
and F (T ) ∈ C and θ /∈ B imply that
µ
1
T
¶
)k+T−1(x, θ) ≤
µ
1
T
¶
lnS(x, k, θ) +
X
h∈K
·
Nh(T )
T
¸
g0h − 3δ.
Since Q0 is irreducible, for every h,
lim
T→∞
Nh(T )
T
= s0h,
lim
T→∞
F (T ) = Q0.
Hence, eventually (a.s.) ¯¯¯¯
¯X
h∈K
µ
Nh(T )
T
− s0h
¶
g0h
¯¯¯¯
¯ ≤ δ3 ,
and so, eventually,
θ ∈ A⇒
µ
1
T
¶
)k+T−1(X, θ) ≥
µ
1
T
¶
lnS(X, k, θ) +
X
h∈K
s0hg
0
h −
7δ
3
,
θ /∈ B⇒
µ
1
T
¶
)k+T−1(X, θ) ≤
µ
1
T
¶
lnS(X, k, θ) +
X
h∈K
s0hg
0
h −
8δ
3
.
Note that
ψ(T )(B)
ψ(T )(˜B)
≥ ψ(T )(A)
ψ(T )(˜B)
.
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Hence, eventually,
ψ(T )(B)
ψ(T )(˜B)
≥
R
A S(X, k, θ) exp{T
£P
h∈K s
0
hg
0
h − 7δ3
¤}dµ(θ)R
˜B S(X, k, θ) exp{T
£P
h∈K s
0
hg
0
h − 8δ3
¤}dµ(θ)
=
· R
A S(X, k, θ)dµ(θ)R
˜B S(X, k, θ)dµ(θ)
¸
exp{Tδ
3
}
→ ∞ as T →∞,
and so
π lim
T→∞
ψ(T )(B) = 1,
which completes the proof of the theorem.
Suppose that the true p0 ∈ S is stationary, but the DM’s prior assigns probability
one to M(k), and p0 is not in M(k). What will happen to the DM’s posteriors? The
following corollary, which is stated without proof, provides an answer this question.
Corollary 8 Suppose that
(1) p0 determines the stochastic process {X(t)};
(2) µ[M(k)] = 1;
(3) Q(k, p0), the conditional k’th-order transition probability matrix implied by p0,
is irreducible, with stationary probability vector s(k, p0); and define
(4) θ(k, p0) = [Q(k, p0), s(k, p0)];
then the sequence of posteriors converges to the Dirac measure D[θ(k, p0)] a.s. with
respect to the measure p0.
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3.2 Bayesian Analysis in M
In this subsection I show that consistent Bayesian analysis is possible for a large class
of priors on the entire spaceM . For each k, let µk be a prior such that µk[M(k)] = 1,
and that has full support onM(k). Let {αk} be a sequence of strictly positive numbers
whose sum is unity, and define
µ =
∞X
k=0
αkµk.
From (15), the posterior distribution is
ψ(x, T )(A) ≡
P∞
k=0 αk
R
A
LT (x, θ)dµk(θ)P∞
k=0 αk
R
M
LT (x, θ)dµk(θ
.
Recall that θ0denotes the value of θ that generates X∞.
Theorem 9 Suppose that θ0 ∈M(k0) is irreducible; then µ is consistent for θ0.
Proof. Let A ⊂M be open and containing θ0, such that A is disjoint from M(k)
for k < k0. Then we want to show that
lim
T→∞
ψ(X∞, T )(A) = 1 a.s.
For every k, the posterior probability measure corresponding to the prior µk is
ψk(X∞, T )(A) ≡
R
A
LT (X∞, θ)dµk(θ)R
M
LT (X∞, θ)dµk(θ
.
By Theorem 6, for each k ≥ k0, this posterior probability converges a.s. to one
as T increases without bound. Hence there is a (measurable) subset C of X with
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θ0-probability one such that for every x ∈ C,
for all k, lim
T→∞
ψk(x, T )(A) = 1.
Fix x ∈ C, and for the purposes of this proof define
YT (k) =
Z
A
LT (x, θ)dµk(θ),
ZT (k) =
Z
M
LT (x, θ)dµk(θ);
then
ψ(x, T )(A) =
P∞
k=0 αkYT (k)P∞
k=0 αkZT (k)
.
Note that 0 ≤ YT (k) ≤ ZT (k) ≤ 1, and YT (k) = 0 for k < k0. Define
βk =
αkP
m≥k0 αm
, for k ≥ k0,
= 0, for k < k0;
then
ψ(x, T )(A) =
P
k βkYT (k)P
k βkZT (k)
.
Define
fT (k) =
ZT (k)
h
1− YT (k)
ZT (k)
i
P
m βmZT (m)
, for k ≥ k0.
Observe that
0 ≤ fT (k) ≤ 1−
YT (k)
ZT (k)
≤ 1.
By Theorem 6,
lim
T→∞
fT (k) = 0, for k ≥ k0.
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Think of {βk} as a finite measure on the integers ≥ k0; then by the Dominated
Convergence Theorem (or use an elementary argument),
lim
T→∞
X
k
βkfT (k) = 0.
From the definition of fT (k),
X
k
βkfT (k) =
P
k βkZT (k)
h
1− YT (k)
ZT (k)
i
P
m βmZT (m)
=
P
k βk [ZT (k)− YT (k)]P
m βmZT (m)
= 1−
P
k βkYT (k)P
m βmZT (m)
= 1− ψ(x, T )(A).
Hence
lim
T→∞
[1− ψ(x, T )(A)] = 0,
which completes the proof.
It is not known to me whether the last theorem can be generalized to cover, S, the
class of all stationary processes in this setting. (For related work, see Sims, 1971.)
4 A “Bayesian” Analysis of Model Revision
Suppose now that the parameter k is not known. If an upper bound on k, were known,
say k00, then a Bayesian could estimate θ consistently by taking a suitable prior on
M(k00). However, if an upper bound is not known, then the Bayesian must take a
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prior on M , which is infinite dimensional. As noted in the Introduction, it might
be diﬃcult for an individual to formulate beliefs about such a large space that are
suﬃciently precise to yield a meaningful prior. In this section I outline an alternative
approach, which is a process of model revision suggested by considerations of bounded
rationality. This process yields estimates of θ in M that are “consistent” in a sense
to be defined below.
In decision-making in the economic sphere, the decision-maker (henceforth DM)
usually starts with a model of behavior of the relevant agents (consumers, firms,
traders), but the model has unknown parameters. Suppose that the DM’s model
implies that the process, {X(t)}, is a stationary k’th-order Markov process, i.e., the
DM assumes that the probability measure p in P (X) is inM(k), for a particular value
of k, say k1. Let p0 denote the true probability measure, and assume that p0 is in M
but not necessarily in M(k1). Assume, also, that p0 is irreducible. Finally, assume
that the DM’s prior probability measure on M(k1), say µ1, has full support.
According to Corollary 8, in this situation the DM’s posterior distributions will
converge to a distribution concentrated on a point in M(k1), namely
p0(k1) ≡ D[Q(k1, p0), s(k1, p0)].
If p0 is in M(k1), then p0(k1) = p0. However, if p0 is not in M(k1), then p0(k1) will not
equal p0, although it will be consistent with p0 on cylinder sets in X of length (k+1).
If the DM uses only Bayes’s Theorem to make inferences about p, then he will only
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calculate statistics about cylinder set of length (k1 + 1), and he will never learn that
the true probability measure is not in M(k1).
Suppose now that the DM starts to consider a diﬀerent model. There are various
reasons that this might happen. For example, new developments in economics or
other social sciences might lead him to suspect that his original model is not adequate.
The DM might also engage in some “data mining” and simply explore the statistics of
cylinder sets of length greater than (k1+1). Suppose that the new model implies that
the process p is in M(k2) with k2 > k1. This last inequality is more of a convention
than an assumption. If k2 were less than or equal to k1 then the DM would suﬀer
no loss by continuing with the hypothesis that p ∈ M(k1), except possibly a loss of
eﬃciency of estimation from using a larger parameter space than necessary.
We can now imagine that this procedure is repeated indefinitely. (I shall describe
the procedure and its implications more formally below.) Roughly speaking, it will
result in a sequence { µn} of priors with larger and larger supports, M(kn). To
each prior will correspond a (stochastic) process of posteriors, ψn(X∞, T ), with the
properties described above. Recall that p0is the true probability measure governing
the stochastic process {X(t)}, and supppose that p0 is in M(k0). Again, by Corollary
8, for each model n ,
lim
T→∞
ψn(X∞, T ) = D[p
0(kn)]. (41)
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Furthermore,
lim
T→∞
ψn(X∞, T ) = p
0 if kn ≥ k0.
However, these last equations are not in themselves enough to characterize the
DM’s process of inference. For this, it will be necessary to specify what posterior,
say Ψ(T ), the DM will be using at each date T . . Let n(T ) denote the model that
the DM is using at date T ; then
Ψ(T ) = ψn(T )(X∞, T ). (42)
The goal is to choose successive models and priors so that, in some sense, the posteriors
Ψ(T ) eventually get “close” to p0. To achieve this, the DM needs to have enough
evidence about any given model. The larger the model, i.e., the larger the space
M(kn), the slower will be the convergence of the corresponding posteriors. Hence the
DM must not change models too quickly.
I shall now describe the process of model revision more precisely. Let {kn} and
{tn} be strictly increasing (deterministic) sequences of integers, and suppose that the
DM switches to model M(kn) at date tn. For the moment, think of the sequence of
dates as deterministic. Corresponding to each n is a prior, µn, onM(kn) and to each
T such that tn ≤ T < tn+1, a posterior, ψn(X∞, T ). .
I now present the main result of this section. To simplify the notation, and
without any essential loss of generality, assume that each model revision increases
k by 1, so that kn = n. In fact, I shall suppress the symbol n altogether, so that
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the DM switches to model M(k) at date t(k). Accordingly, at a date T such that
t(k) ≤ T < t(k+1), the DM’s prior on M(k) is denoted by µk and the corresponding
posterior by ψk(T )(x) for the particular realization x of the stochastic process X∞
(see Section 3). As noted at the beginning of Section 3, the probability measure µk
on M(k) induces a probability measure, say νk, on Y (k) =M(k)×X.
For δ > 0 and θ ∈ M(k) let V k(θ, δ) denote the interior of the Euclidean ball in
M(k) with center θ and radius δ, and for any x ∈ X define
mkT (x, θ, δ) = ψ
k(x, T )(x)V k(θ, δ). (43)
Note that mkT (X∞, θ, δ) is a random variable on the probability space [Y (k), ν
k].
Finally, let M 0(k) denote the set of irreducible θs in M(k), i.e.,
M 0(k) = {θ ∈M(k)|θ is irreducible} ,
and let
Y 0(k) =M 0(k)×X.
Theorem 10 Suppose that, for each k, µk [M 0(k) = 1]. Let {δk}, {k} be any two
sequences of strictly positive numbers converging to 0; then there exist a sequence of
times, {t(k)}, and a sequence of sets, {A(k)}, such that
A(k) ⊂ Y 0(k), (44)
νk[A(k)] ≥ 1− k, and (45)
T ≥ t(k)⇒ mkT (x, θ, δk) ≥ 1− k for all (x, θ) ∈ A(k).
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Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of Egoroﬀ’s Theorem (e.g.,
Halmos (1950), p. 88). To begin the proof, fix k and δ. By Theorem 6, conditional
on θ ∈M 0(k),
lim
T→∞
mkT (x, θ, δ) = 1, a.s., given θ. (46)
Hence the same statement is true unconditionally on the space Y 0(k). By Egoroﬀ’s
Theorem, this convergence is “almost uniform,” i.e., for every  > 0 there exists a set
A0(δ, ) ⊂ Y 0(k) such that
νk[A0(δ, )] ≥ 1− ,
mkT (x, θ, δ) → 1 uniformly in A0(δ, ).
Hence there exists T (δ, ) such that
T ≥ T (δ, )⇒ mkT (x, θ, δ) ≥ 1−  for all (x, θ) ∈ A0(δ, ).
To complete the proof, take
t(k) = T (δk, k), (47)
A(k) = A0(δk, k).
The conclusion of the preceding theorem is diﬀerent in a subtle but important
way from that of Theorem 6. It states that the DM is increasingly confident that the
current posterior is increasingly concentrated on the true θ.
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The analysis of two interesting questions lies beyond the scope of this paper. First,
it would be useful to know something about how fast t(k) increases with k, and how
the sequence {t(k)} depends on δ and . Note that the dimension of M(k) increases
geometrically with k. Second, in the light of Proposition 5, one might conjecture that
an analogue of the preceding Theorem would be true for the entire set of stationary
processes.
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